Draghi’s reform programme will probably guide whatever coalition government emerges from the September 25 elections. Draghi’s programme, written in haste, it was scarcely discussed by parliament or country. Da Financial Times.
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In financial markets and among Italy’s EU allies, the fall of Mario Draghi’s government sparked immediate concern about the sustainability of the national reform effort. The outlook is not uniformly bleak but is nonetheless discomforting. On the one hand, Draghi’s reform programme will probably guide whatever coalition government emerges from the September 25 elections. Compliance with these reforms is the condition for Italy to continue receiving the EU’s post-pandemic recovery funds, and for any use of the European Central Bank’s new bond-buying initiative, known as the “transmission protection instrument”, in support of Italian sovereign debt. On the other hand, mere allegiance to Draghi’s reforms may be insufficient to remedy, even gradually, Italy’s deeper institutional weaknesses. The electoral system is a case in point. Uniquely among western democracies, Italy has passed four radical electoral reforms in the past two decades.